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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of a company’s unfunded pension liabilities on its stock 
market valuation. Using a sample of UK FTSE350 firms with defined benefit pension 
schemes, we  find that although unfunded pension liabilities reduce the market value of 
the firm, the coefficient estimates indicate a less than one-for-one effect. Moreover, 
there is no evidence of significantly negative subsequent abnormal returns for highly 
underfunded schemes. These results suggests that shareholders do take into 
consideration the unfunded pension liabilities when valuing the firm, but do not fully 
incorporate all available information.  
Keywords: Pension assets, pension liabilities, stock market transparency, FRS 17 
JEL Classification: G23 
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1. Introduction 
A funded defined benefit (DB) pension scheme requires scheme sponsors to have 
sufficient assets to cover the pension promise, determined by a formula which takes into 
account the employee’s wage, salary, year of service as well as any social insurance 
benefits. A pension deficit arises when the value of the scheme’s liabilities exceeds the 
value of assets as a consequence of reduced valuation of the assets or increased 
liabilities. Pension deficits represent a true liability for the sponsoring company and 
should affect the firm’s value on a one-for-one base if no tax and government 
regulations are taken into consideration
1
. Pension liabilities can affect a firm’s earning 
and cash flow through both accounting and government regulations. Either the financial 
contribution to the plan or the amortization of the liabilities can lower the earning of the 
firm. Government regulations also impose compulsory contributions on severely 
underfunded plans. Examples include Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 in US and 
the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in UK. 
 
The UK pension system is distinctive in having very high levels of DB pension 
commitments. Although the low stock market returns in recent years, has meant that 
many firms have chosen to close their DB schemes in the hope of transferring the 
investment risk from employers to employees (evident from the hand-collected data of 
FTSE350 firms with DB schemes during 2001 and 2002, see section 3.4 for details). 
However statistics show that DB pension liabilities still amount to about 30 per cent of 
the overall value of major UK corporations compared to 13 per cent in the US. It is 
natural to ask whether the stock market correctly values these liabilities.  
 
The correct valuation of the corporate pension liabilities not only concerns stock market 
efficiency but also has macroeconomic implications for national saving. This paper uses 
UK data for all the companies that comprise the FTSE350 stock market index with 
defined benefit pension schemes over the period 2001-2005, to examine whether 
pension fund deficits are reflected in the stock market value of the company, using two 
alternative empirical approaches: a market valuation approach (Feldstein and Seligman, 
                                                
1 For the sample period (2001-2005), in the UK, the accounting standard Financial Reporting Standard 17 
(FRS17) does not require compulsory disclosure of the pension deficit on the balance sheet. The 
transitional regulations only require disclosure in the notes that accompany the balance sheet. The 
relationship between corporate debt and pension deficit will be discussed in more details in Section 3.2. 
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1981), and an asset pricing methodology (Franzoni and Marin, 2006). The market value 
approach examines whether the value of unfunded pension liabilities are reflected in a 
company’s market value. The asset pricing method examines the stock market response 
to subsequent corporate earnings announcements of firms with pension deficits, on the 
basis that any deficit will need additional contributions out of company earnings.  
 
In the UK the newly introduced Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS17) enables one 
to get access to the fair value of pension assets and liabilities from the firm’s annual 
report. Using data from 2001 to 2005, we estimate the effect of unfunded pension 
deficit on corporate share price using two alternative models. Using a sample of UK 
FTSE350 firms with defined benefit pension schemes, we find that unfunded pension 
liabilities reduce the market value of the firm but the coefficient estimates indicate a less 
than one-for-one effect. Moreover, there is no significant evidence of subsequent 
negative abnormal returns for highly underfunded schemes. The results from these two 
models are consistent with each other and imply that shareholders do take into 
consideration the unfunded pension liabilities when valuing the firm, but do not fully 
incorporate the information, and this causes an overvaluation of the firm. The results 
could also be caused by the pension contribution regulations in the UK: pension 
contributions made to cover the deficit are smoothed over a number of years and any 
financial pressures they impose on earnings are consequently weakened. As a 
robustness check, equivalent regressions are run using data under the most recent 
funding requirements.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature 
on the topic. Section 3 describes the methodology and the hypothesis to be tested 
following the Feldstein and Seligman (1981) and Franzoni and Marin (2006) 
approaches. Section 4 defines the pension plan variables and summarises the data. 
Sections 5 and 6 present the regression results for the market value and asset pricing 
models respectively. The last section summarises the paper. 
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2. Related Research on the Stock Market Reaction to Pension Deficits 
A number of papers have evaluated the stock market reaction to publicly available 
information on pension deficits.
 
This literature can be broadly attributed to two main 
strands, namely the efficient pension liabilities valuation approach or the market 
valuation model, and the asset pricing methodology. This section relates this paper to 
these two strands and provides further explanation of the determinants of pension 
liabilities. 
 
The market valuation model argues that the stock market reaction to unfunded pension 
liabilities depends critically on shareholders’ ability to recognise that there is an 
obligation to make future payments to fund the promised pensions, and this realization 
should leave their consumption unchanged in response to the increased accounting 
profit, from the temporary un-funding. Feldstein (1978) discusses the relation between 
pension liabilities and aggregate savings by employers and employees based on these 
arguments.  
 
Earlier work (Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), and Bulow, 
Morck, and Summers (1987)) find results consistent with the conclusion that share 
prices fully reflect the value of unfunded pension obligations, so the market correctly 
takes into account pension liabilities when valuing a company—a one dollar change of 
pension funding status will change the share price by one dollar (both relative to the 
firm’s market value). However a more recent paper by Coronado and Sharpe (2003) 
finds evidence of overvaluation of all DB firms by looking at different measures of 
underlying values of net pension obligations.  
 
Recent studies for the UK market have found that the valuation of pension deficits is 
subject to the choice of actuarial valuation methods such as discount rates and 
investment strategies (Klumpes and Whittington, 2003) and the stock market reacts 
differently to the pension funding status under different accounting assumptions 
(Klumpes and McMeeking, 2007). Besides share prices, evidence has also been found 
that investors tend to give different weightings to pension deficits recognised in the 
balance sheet as opposed to off-balance sheet deficits (disclosed in footnotes) in the 
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determination of other market variables such as corporate bond spreads (Cardinale, 
2005). 
 
The market valuation model is by definition a cross-sectional test so it has low data 
requirements and the interpretation of the parameters is relatively straightforward. 
However like many other valuation models, the choice of explanatory variables (or 
determinant of the dependent variable) is quite ‘ad hoc’ (Coronado and Sharpe, 2003) 
and subject to individual discretion. It has a severe problem of potential omitted 
variables which may bias the estimation and affect the explanatory power of the model. 
Moreover the model does not take into account the endogeneity of pension funding 
status variables and the correlation (time lag) between share price and pension deficit. 
Last but not least, as Franzoni and Marin (2006) argue, given the low standard error for 
the coefficient of pension deficit, a coefficient estimate for pension deficit less than 
minus one cannot be rejected either, which means the model still leaves the question of 
overvaluation unanswered. 
 
The asset pricing method attempts to circumvent the above problems. Rather than 
focusing on the determinants of market value, it uses an asset pricing model to 
investigate the return anomalies caused by the mispricing of pension deficits and the 
model is related to a body of work in accounting, in which a number of accounting 
items could have an influence on future earnings. For example, Bernard and Thomas 
(1990) report the failure of stock prices to reflect the implications of current earnings for 
future earnings, which is a result of systematic surprise about autocorrelated earnings.  
 
Using US data for the past 20 years, and applying this methodology to pension deficits, 
Franzoni and Marin (2006) find that the decile portfolio of the most underfunded 
companies earn lower raw returns than companies with healthier pension schemes. This 
mispricing is magnified when they use the Fama and French (1993) factor model to 
compute the abnormal returns by looking at the difference between portfolio mean 
returns and the expected return estimated from the factor model. They attribute this 
earning anomaly to be a manifestation of the price adjustment following the negative 
surprise of the market. 
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3. Model Specifications 
3.1. The Market Valuation Models 
The starting point of the market valuation model is Tobin (1969), where he sets up a 
general framework for monetary analysis. He argues that the market value of a firm’s 
assets (V) should be proportional to the replacement value of the assets (A), i.e. V = qA
2
. 
The parameter q would be equal to one in equilibrium under some strict assumptions 
but normally this value may also depend on other variables that could affect the firm’s 
ability to provide excess return. A higher ratio of total earning to assets (E/A) or a 
higher growth rate of it (GROW) would increase q for their positive effects on firm’s 
profitability. 
 
The level of corporate debt could also affect the equilibrium value of q. By Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) a firm’s total market value is independent of its capital structure, thus 
corporate leverage would have no effect on the firm’s market value under the strict 
M&M assumptions. However in the real world debt may have positive or negative 
implications for market value of the firm—a high debt/capital (DEBT/A) ratio could 
decrease firm’s market value by increasing the bankruptcy risk or increase it because of 
any tax benefits. Another variable related to the perceived riskiness of a firm, and which 
could influence its market value is the firm’s beta coefficient. 
 
Pension liabilities are similar to corporate debt and if pension deficit has to be disclosed 
on the balance sheet then it represents a true liability for the sponsoring firm in 
accounting terms as well. If unfunded pension liabilities are not recorded in the 
corporate balance sheets, as in the transitional arrangements for FRS17 where only 
footnote disclosure is required, then pension liability and corporate debt will have some 
subtle differences, as described in the introduction. Pension liabilities and corporate 
debt are also different in terms of their tax treatments: the interest cost arising from a 
firm’s debt is a tax deductible expense, whilst the interest income received by the 
pension fund (and pension contributions) is not taxed. Therefore theoretically a pound 
of unfunded pension liability will reduce the market value of a firm by only 1-tc where tc 
is the marginal corporate tax rate. However given the fact that many firms do not take 
                                                
2
 Detailed definitions of the variables are presented in Section 3.4. 
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advantage of this tax benefit, Feldstein (1978) argues that it’s because shareholders 
anticipate this implicit tax benefit and adjust their consumption so that the reduction in 
firm value approaches its pre-tax level. Given the above considerations, if the unfunded 
pension liabilities (PD) are correctly valued, they would be equivalent to an equal value 
of debt, but under FRS 17 transitional arrangements, they only appear as footnotes to 
the accounts. Therefore, unfunded pension liabilities will not decrease the current assets 
and will increase the accounting profit. This joint effect will reduce the relative value of 
the firm’s market value to its total assets (i.e. q) from 1 – tc to 1, given that the pension 
deficits are correctly valued by shareholders. To summarise, the total market value 
equation can be written 
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
it
it
it
A
PD
A
DEBT
BETAGROW
A
E
A
V
εαααααα ++++++= 543210             (1) 
where PDit is the pre-tax pension deficits of company i in year t and εit is the error. α5 is 
the main coefficient of interest and should be negative  and -1< α5<-(1-tc) (for the UK  
α5 should lie between 0.7 and 1 since the UK’s tc was 30% during our sample period) 
before tax (PD). If we replace PD with the pension deficit after deferred tax and other 
non-recoverable surplus (NETPD), α5 should equal –1. We should also observe positive 
values for α1 and α2. The coefficient estimates of corporate beta (α3) and leverage ratio 
(α4) are more ambiguous and depend on whether the tax benefit or bankruptcy risk 
dominates in the analysis. 
 
An alternative specification is to rewrite equation (1) only including the equity 
components of the variables. Since the total market value of the firm consists of both 
equity and debt parts, those two specifications would be different from each other if one 
assumes different q value for debt and equity. The following equity value equation 
assumes the market value of equity (VE) of the firm is proportional to the equity asset 
(AE): AEqVE E= . The complete specification of the equity value equation is similar to 
the total market value equation: 
it
it
it
it
it
itit
it
it
it
it
AE
PD
AE
DEBT
BETAGROWE
AE
EE
AE
VE
ηββββββ ++++++= 543210       (2) 
where EEit are the firm’s equity earnings and GROWEit is the ten-year growth of the EE. 
The parameter estimations from equation (2) are expected to have similar signs to those 
of equation (1) but possibly of different magnitude.  
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Up till now pension deficit (PD) has been treated as an exogenous variable however the 
correct valuation of unfunded pension liabilities involves dealing appropriately with 
three issues: first, the tax deductibility of pension obligations; second, the accounting 
methods, such as the discount rate used to calculate the present value of assets and 
liabilities and the assumptions made for benefit and asset yields; third, the uncertainty 
of benefits and asset yields. Consider a firm with an obligation to pay future pension 
benefits, the fair value of this liability incurred will obviously depend on the tax 
treatment of pension expenses and thus influence the way it affects the firm’s share 
price. Under the accounting standard FRS17 pension scheme liabilities must be 
measured using a projected unit method and discounted at an AA corporate bond rate so 
little confusion is likely to appear. However under FRS17 scheme assets are measured 
at ‘fair value’ using assumed expected returns for different investment instruments. 
Therefore the market value of the pension deficit depends on the discretion of different 
accountants. Even if the dispute about accounting methods were eliminated, the 
uncertainty about pension benefits and asset yields in future years still remains. This 
could be caused by the uncertainty about future inflation rate or real wage growth or 
even the possibility of the failure of the pension plan or bankruptcy of the firm. The 
riskiness of the securities that the pension assets are invested in can also influence the 
share price, as corporate debt or the beta coefficient does. A higher proportion invested 
in equities may increase their riskiness and thus decrease the present value of pension 
assets. Managers of immature pension schemes with few current pension obligations 
may be more willing to invest pension assets in equities which have a higher return than 
bonds, whilst those mature schemes that have to pay a large amount of pension benefits 
in a short time may be less inclined to invest in risky securities. Finally firms may 
deliberately leave their pension scheme with large deficits so as to take advantage of  
government insurance protection schemes such as the PBGC in US and the PPF in UK. 
 
3.2. The Asset Pricing Method 
Unfunded DB pension liabilities are likely to have negative implications for future 
earnings and cash flows of firms. According to Franzoni and Marin (2006) this is 
mainly caused by the institutional and accounting regulations that require mandatory 
amortization for highly underfunded schemes. If investors are unaware of this effect, 
when pension liabilities are due and start to affect earnings and cash flows, the investors 
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will be surprised by a negative shock to earnings. As a manifestation of the price 
adjustment following this negative surprise, low returns should be observed for those 
firms with highly underfunded pension schemes. 
 
Our measurement of a firm’s funding status follows Franzoni and Marin (2006). Since it 
is the relative value of the pension deficit that has implications for a scheme’s funding 
status, the pension deficit (PD) is scaled by relevant variables in both the market 
valuation model and the asset pricing model. Franzoni and Marin (2006) use market 
capitalization as the scaling parameter. They argue that it is a firm’s future cash flows, 
information diffusion and credit constraints that vary the extent to which pension 
deficits may affect the return. Since market capitalization is correlated to all these three 
variables, it is chosen as the scaling parameter. We define the funding ratio of scheme i 
in year t as 
it
it
it
itit
it
CapMkt
PD
CapMkt
PAPL
FR
  
=
−
=                                                     (3) 
where PAit is the pension scheme’s assets and PLit is its liabilities, both reported 
according to FRS17.  
 
One benefit of using the above measurement is that a highly underfunded firm (with 
high positive FR since PD is defined as pension liabilities net of assets) is likely to be a 
small firm with high book-to-market
3
 ratio. Given the fact that small firms with high 
book-to-market usually earn high returns, if low returns are observed for those firms 
they are not likely to be explained by risk factors such as size or book-to-market ratio.  
 
To assess  whether highly underfunded firms earn lower risk-adjusted returns, the asset 
pricing model uses the calendar-time portfolio methods introduced by Lyon, Barber and 
Tsai (1999), who discuss an improved method for long-run abnormal returns tests. This 
method involves calculating the return on a portfolio composed of firms that had an 
event within some period of interest. Then the Fama-French three-factor factor model is 
applied to the calendar-time return on the portfolio to estimate the abnormal return: 
                                                
3
 By simple manipulation FR can be rewritten as  
CapMkt
Book
Book
PAPL
FR
 
−
= . For a fixed first ratio, a higher FR corresponds to a higher B/M ratio. 
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ittititiiit HMLhSMBsRFRMR εβα ++++=                                        (4) 
where Rit is the excess return of portfolio i at time t and εit is the error term. For the 
factors, RMRFt is the difference between the return of value-weighted market index and 
the return of the monthly return on three-month Treasury bills, SMBt is the difference 
between the returns on value-weighted small- and big-stock portfolios and HMLt is the 
difference for high and low book-to-market portfolios. The time-series estimate of the 
intercept αi provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal return 
on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. In this paper, calendar-portfolios are constructed 
by sorting firms according to the funding ratio (FR). Since pension data is updated 
annually by the requirement of FRS17, portfolios are reformed annually rather than 
monthly as in Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). If firms with large pension deficits are 
overvalued, the market should be negatively surprised about the deficits and as the 
result of the negative surprise, highly underfunded companies should have low expected 
returns (i.e. negative αi). 
 
However as the name ‘market value effect’ indicates, using FR to measure the funding 
status could cause severe problems as well. Failure to find a negative abnormal return 
for highly underfunded firms cannot lead to a rejection of the hypothesis that those 
firms are overvalued since this could just be because the positive effect of a high book-
to-market ratio is so large that it dominates the negative impact of unfunded pension 
liabilities. Therefore in section 3.7 robustness checks are performed using different 
measures of funding status in the hope of eliminating this size effect. 
 
4. The Data 
This section reports the data selection and construction method for the regression 
variables. We start by discussing pension-related data mainly collected manually from 
the FRS17 disclosure in firms’ financial reports and then non-pension related data 
collected from Datastream. 
 
4.1. Pension Plan Data 
The sample period of this paper ranges from 2001—the first year UK firms were 
required to disclose pension funding data in companies’ reports and accounts by FRS 
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17—to 2005
4
. For the sample period FRS17 does not require compulsory disclosure of 
the pension deficit on the balance sheet. Transitional stage regulations only require 
disclosures in the notes that accompany the balance sheet. Not much inference can be 
drawn from the data prior to 2001 since before FRS17 firms were only required to 
publish smoothed pension costs occasionally, but this data is different from the market 
value of pension deficits
5
.    
 
Pension data was manually collected for all FTSE350 companies in the UK market with 
at least one defined benefit pension scheme from the corporate financial statement. 
According to FRS17 transitional requirements, pension data can be found in the 
footnote to the financial statement. The statement of Financial Reporting Standard 17 by 
the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) defines pension scheme assets (PA) and 
liabilities (PL) and their valuation methods as following: 
• Assets in a defined benefit scheme should be measured at their fair value at the 
balance sheet date. Scheme assets include current assets as well as investments. 
Any liabilities such as accrued expenses should be deducted. 
• Defined benefit scheme liabilities should be measured on an actuarial basis 
using the projected unit method. The scheme liabilities include: (a) any benefits 
promised under the formal terms of the scheme; and (b) any constructive 
obligations for further benefits where a public statement or past practice by the 
employer has created a valid expectation in the employees that such benefits will 
be granted. 
A vested pension liability (which is what appears on firm’s financial statements) can be 
decomposed into funded and unfunded liabilities: the former means the liability is 
covered by scheme assets and vice versa. Obviously what matters is the unfunded 
pension liability, which in this paper we will call the pension deficit (PD) and by 
definition PD = PL – PA. A scheme is said to be overfunded if one observes a negative 
PD and underfunded if PD is positive. NETPD denotes pension deficit net of deferred 
                                                
4 For the cross-sectional tests in the market valuation model (equations (1) and (2)) only data from 2001, 
2002 are used. 2001 and 2002 were the first two years FRS 17 transitional arrangement was introduced. 
The whole dataset from 2001 to 2005 are used in the asset pricing model. 
5
 See Section 2.5.2 for details. 
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tax
6
 and other non-recoverable surplus and this is usually the term that will enter the 
balance sheet under the requirement of FRS17
7
. 
 
4.2. Non-pension Variables 
This section summarises the definition and calculation methods for the non-pension 
variables for the empirical tests of the market valuation and asset pricing model. 
Detailed definitions of the variables are to be found in the appendix. These variables are 
constructed to be consistent with the definitions in Feldstein and Seligman (1981). All 
the accounting data are either found in Datastream or from Thomson ONE Banker. 
Datastream reports the market capitalization of each firm (VE) at the end of every 
financial year. The equity earning (EE), defined as total earnings net of the interest 
expense on debt, is the sum of net income available to common and preferred dividends. 
The book value of each firm’s net debt (DEBT) is defined as the sum of short term and 
long term debt minus cash and it is provided by the firm’s cash flow statement (or its 
note) and to be consistent with the sign of PD, positive DEBT means deficit and 
negative value stands for surplus. For the beta coefficients (BETA) the value given in 
Datastream is adopted. 
 
The total market value of the firm (V) is calculated as the sum of the book value of long-
term debt and common equity, both of which are available in Thomson ONE Banker. 
The replacement value of a firm’s plant and equipment is available on the firm’s 
balance sheet, which together with the book value of the firm’s total inventories form 
the market value of the firm’s capital stock (A)
8
. By definition the total earning (E) 
equals EE plus the interest expense on debt. The net asset value of the corporation’s 
equity (AE) is calculated as the firm’s physical assets minus the sum of debt and 
preferred stock, i.e., AE = A – DEBT – PS. The growth rate of total earnings (GROW) is 
defined as the difference between the average E in the most recent five years and the 
                                                
6
 The term ‘deferred tax’ means ‘the estimated future tax consequences of transactions and events 
recognised in the financial statements of the current and previous periods’. It concerns the tax treatment 
of most types of timing difference, which includes ‘accruals for pension costs and other post-retirement 
benefits that will be deductible for tax purposes only when paid’. See FRS19: Deferred Tax for details. 
7
 Difference between the asset or liability in the balance sheet and the surplus and deficit in the scheme 
will arise because of the related deferred tax balance and also when part of a surplus or deficit has not 
been recognised in the balance sheet, for example when part of the surplus in the scheme is not 
recoverable by the employer or when past services awards have not yet vested. 
8
 To run the Tobin’s Q regressions in Feldstein and Seligman (1981), where A is needed, the sample only 
includes non-financial firms , thus no intangible assets are included in the calculation of A. 
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previous five years, divided by A and the growth of EE (GROWE) is the ten-year 
difference in equity earnings divided by AE, the value of equity asset. 
 
5. Estimation of Market Valuation Models 
5.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
The sample covers all FTSE350 non-financial firms with at least one defined benefit 
pension scheme in 2001 and 2002 and cross-sectional regressions are run for each year. 
These were the first and second year for which pension funding status data becomes 
available on corporate financial statements under FRS17. The footnote disclosure 
ensures that the pension deficit will not reduce the assets of the firm like debt, so we are  
more likely to find a result similar to Feldstein and Seligman (1981). To correct for 
outliers, the dependent variables (V/A or VE/AE) are winsorized at 99% level. For total 
market value equations there are 129 firms in 2001 and 127 firms for 2002 whilst for 
equity value equations the sample size is 130 and 112 for 2001 and 2002 respectively. 
 
Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for the variables used in equations (1) 
and (2). In both years qE is greater than q and whilst q (i.e. V/A) is close to its 
equilibrium value, qE is significantly greater than unity especially in 2001 when it is 
greater than 2. This reflects overvaluation in the stock market and results in the dramatic 
decrease of both total earnings (E) and equity earnings (EE) and their growth. This 
effect is most obvious in 2002 for equity earnings, with an average value of –5% of 
equity assets and together with the large standard deviation, reflects the market crash 
around 2000.  
 
Another interesting feature is that in both cases the net debt to capital ratio remains at 
fairly high levels. On the one hand this reflects the shrinking market in the sample years 
and on the other hand the debt is so high that the tax saving it created exceeds the 
bankruptcy risk and this effect is especially dominant for equity variables. 
 
In the first year of FRS17 implementation- 2001, firms have relatively low unfunded 
pension liabilities or are in surplus. However in 2002 the average deficit has increased 
dramatically to more than 10 percent of assets. This may result from pension schemes 
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putting a large proportion of assets in equities, whose value decreased significantly due 
to the low stock returns. Facing these large pension deficits, more employers chose to 
close their defined benefit pension schemes to new members and the number of closures 
more than doubled in 2002. This observation is consistent with the discussion at the 
beginning of the paper that DB schemes have severe funding problems and they tend to 
be replaced by DC schemes. The pension deficit/surplus net of deferred tax and other 
non-recoverable surplus (NETPD) is less than the mean PD if it’s negative and vice 
versa because of the tax savings for pension liabilities. 
1
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5.2. Parameter Estimates 
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for the total market value equation (1) for all FTSE350 non-
financial firms with at least one defined benefit pension scheme in 2001 and 2002, the first and the 
second year that FRS17 was introduced. For both years the coefficient estimations of pension 
deficit (PD) are negative but significantly different from minus one. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that unfunded pension liabilities reduce the market value of the firm, although the 
specific point estimates suggest that unfunded pension liabilities are undervalued for most cases, 
which is compatible with the conclusion of Franzoni and Marin (2006).  
 
In 2001 the coefficient of pension deficit before tax (PD/A) stands at -0.46, which implies that a £1 
of unfunded pension liability reduces firm value by £0.46. The coefficient for 2002 is lower at -0.36. 
For both years the point estimates for pension deficits are significantly negative, indicating that 
shareholders realize that there is a substitution effect between pension deficit and future pension 
benefit payments and reduce their current consumption level relative to total assets. Even though 
theory suggests that the coefficient of pre-tax pension deficit can fall between -0.7 and -1, the point 
estimates for both years are consistently larger than -0.7 at a 90% confidence level. When looking at 
pension deficits net of deferred tax (NETPD/A) the result is more ambiguous: in 2001 the 
coefficient estimation is -0.8 and is compatible with the null hypothesis of a one-for-one effect 
whilst for 2002 the coefficient is -0.421 and is significantly smaller than 1 in absolute value.  
 
To summarise the results, shareholders appear to realize the substitution effect of pension deficits 
and future pension benefit payments on future earnings. However given the point estimates of the 
pension deficits variable, the results are less than a one-for-one effect, indicating that pension 
deficits may only be partially incorporated into share prices. The results are consistent with the 
findings by the Pensions Regulator that ‘deficits may be largely but by no means fully factored into 
share prices’.
 9
 A possible explanation is that off-balance sheet disclosure of pension deficits (as 
required under the FRS1 17 transitional arrangement in 2001 and 2002) creates an ‘accounting veil’ 
that impedes the perfect ‘value transparency’ of the market (Coronado and Sharpe, 2003; Picconi, 
2004). It could also be due to the uncertainty within unfunded pension liabilities. Investors may 
(systematically) believe that pension deficits will be smaller in the future because they think the 
stock market will go up or interest rate and inflation will go down. Firms will then adjust their 
                                                
9
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2005): Paying off Pension Fund Deficits – Impact on company behaviour, share prices 
and the macro-economy. 
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pension liabilities to reflect such expectations by changing assumptions underlying the valuation of 
pension deficits.  
Table 2 
Coefficient Estimates for Total Market Value Equation 
Regression results for equation (1) using hand-collected data from corporate financial statement and Thomson 
ONE Banker. The dependent variable in each specification is the firm’s total market value (debt and equity) 
scaled by the capital stock (firm’s physical assets, including tangible assets and inventories) of the firm. The 
sample period is 2001 and 2002 fiscal year. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Year spec. Constant E/A GROW DEBT/A PD/A NETPD/A BETA R2 
2.1 1.029 -0.318 0.470 -0.126 -0.455  0.023 0.181 
 (0.037) (0.096) (0.245) (0.070) (0.148)  (0.015)  
2.2 1.032 -0.324 0.503 -0.131  -0.798 0.020 0.194 
2001 
 (0.037) (0.096) (0.244) (0.069)  (0.235) (0.015)  
2.3 1.012 -0.198 0.293 0.001 -0.356  0.031 0.092 
 (0.053) (0.078) (0.211) (0.072) (0.172)  (0.039)  
2.4 1.008 -0.205 0.307 -0.001  -0.421 0.030 0.083 
2002 
 (0.053) (0.078) (0.212) (0.073)  (0.239) (0.039)  
 
The stock market crash at the beginning of the new century, may have been responsible for some of 
the more puzzling coefficients in the market value equation. The parameter estimates of the earning 
variable (E/A) indicates that a high ratio of earning to total assets reduces the market value of the 
firm. Specification 2.1 and 2.2 in Table 2 imply that in 2001 a one pound increase in after-tax 
earnings reduces the market value of the firm by up to 32 pence and this effect is alleviated in 2002. 
However an increase in returns still reduces the firm value by about 20%. Two possible reasons 
could have caused this anomaly. First, as indicated by the descriptive statistics, in the sample period 
the ratio of debt to firms’ capital stock was more than 30 percent, therefore the interest expense on 
the debt has taken a large proportion of the total earnings and this part of the total earning obviously 
has less effect on a firm’s future cash flows. This explanation is supported by the estimates for the 
equity value equation in Table 3, where earnings net of interest expense on debt are positively 
correlated with the market value of the firm. Second, at the time of low stock market returns, 
investors universally have a low expectation of future economic growth so what shareholders care 
about are the growth opportunities of the firm rather than the absolute value of total earnings. The 
positive coefficient of the growth variable (GROW) in 2001 implies that shareholders value firms 
that have experienced an increase in earnings during the past 10 years. 
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The coefficient for the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBT/A) in 2001 is around -0.13, suggesting that a 
higher leverage ratio increases the bankruptcy risk of the firm and the effect diminishes in 2002. For 
2001 both of the coefficients of debts and pension deficits are negative, however corporate debt and 
pension deficits are supposed to affect the firm value in different ways, as discussed in Section 3.3. 
The beta coefficient in both years has no significant explanatory power, again confirming that the 
market factor itself cannot account for the return pattern of the firm. 
 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the equity value equations (equation (2)). Not 
surprisingly, when looking at variables related to the firm’s common stock equity, some of the 
effects driven by the high leverage ratio have disappeared. The equity earning of the firm (EE, 
earnings excluding interest expense on debt) now is positively correlated to firm’s market 
capitalization in 2001. Although just slightly above 90 percent confidence level, the coefficient 
suggests that it is the equity earnings that have more implication on the firm’s ability to provide 
above-average earnings. The earning variable lost its explanatory power for 2002. The estimate for 
the growth of the equity earnings for the past 20 years (GROWE) has the right sign but is marginally 
insignificant. 
 
In 2001 a higher debt-to-equity ratio increases the market capitalization of a firm by more than 75% 
and 2002 estimates are still positive though the magnitude reduces to about 0.67. This is possibly 
because the leverage ratio in the sample years is so high that the tax advantage of the debt 
dominates the bankruptcy risks implied by the debt service obligation. Another explanation lies 
within the tradeoff theory
10
, which states that since the interest of debts are usually tax-deductible, 
managers tend to exploit this benefit of debts to the maximum extent until the benefit is fully offset 
by the possible cost of financial distress or credit down-grading caused by higher leverage level. 
According to the tradeoff theory, firms with lower bankruptcy risk or less financially distressed, 
often large and profitable firms with high market capitalisation, tend to borrow more.  
                                                
10
 See for example, Myers (2001). 
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Table 3 
Coefficient Estimates for Equity Value Equation 
Regression results for equation (2) using hand-collected data from corporate financial statement and Thomson 
ONE Banker. The dependent variable in each specification is the firm’s total market capitalization scaled by the 
net capital stock (capital stock (A) net of debt and preferred stock) of the firm. The sample period is 2001 and 
2002 fiscal year. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Year Spec. Constant EE/AE GROWE DEBT/AE PD/AE NETPD/AE BETA R2 
3.1 1.707 0.836 0.502 0.755 -1.589  0.119 0.194 
 (0.217) (0.511) (0.758) (0.155) (0.738)  (0.091)  
3.2 1.710 0.873 0.530 0.757  -2.165 0.106 0.187 
2001 
 (0.218) (0.512) (0.766) (0.156)  (1.151) (0.092)  
3.3 1.405 -0.231 1.014 0.686 -0.711  -0.079 0.169 
 (0.225) (0.309) (0.829) (0.168) (0.495)  (0.161)  
3.4 1.394 -0.231 1.014 0.667  -0.810 -0.080 0.163 
2002 
 (0.226) (0.311) (0.834) (0.168)  (0.714) (0.162)  
 
 
The unfunded pension liabilities have a more notable effect than the total market value equation 
suggests. In 2001, one pound of pre-tax pension deficit reduces the market capitalization by 1.59 
pounds (specification 3.1) and 2.17 (specification 3.2) pounds for deficits net of tax. Both estimates 
fall within the predicted value considering their standard errors. However given the magnitude of 
the estimates, one could argue that by making one pound of contributions, the firm’s value will 
increase by more than one pound, of which shareholders can take advantage. Note that this kind of 
practice is not without cost or limit. First, pension contributions reduce the cash flows that would 
otherwise be used to make investment or pay dividends, which may have negative effects on share 
prices or harm shareholders’ interests
11
. Second, according to the Minimum Funding Requirement, 
there is an upper limit for scheme overfunding, where schemes more than 105% funded have to 
reduce their surplus by benefit improvement or contribution decrease. The coefficients for pension 
data in 2002 have the right sign but lose their explanatory power. When comparing the pension 
coefficients of the total market value and equity value equation, one can find a more ‘favourable’ 
result for 2001—the estimated coefficients are compatible with the expected value at a 95% or 
higher confidence level. One explanation is that due to the Financial Reporting Council’s decision 
to postpone the full implementation of FRS17, according which pension deficits have to enter 
corporate balance sheets and income statements, shareholder may feel less urgent to pay off the full 
                                                
11
 See Liu and Tonks (2008) for details. 
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amount of unfunded pension liabilities to avoid dramatic changes in the debt value in the income 
statement. 
 
However as pointed out by Cardinale (2005), there may exist an  ‘accounting bias’ that gives a 
higher weighting to liabilities recognised in the balance sheet as opposed to off-balance sheet ones 
reported in the footnotes of financial statements
12
. If realized in the balance sheet, the unfunded 
pension liabilities then represent a true liability of the corporation that will reduce the asset value of 
the firm. Pension deficits disclosed in the balance sheet are same as the rest of the corporate debts 
except for the different tax treatment between the two as discussed in Section 3.2. According to the 
transitional arrangement of FRS17, the full implementation of the standard is due from 2005 
financial year and a testable hypothesis using the data after 2005 is that pension deficits will have 
less, if any, impact on the market value of the firm compared to the previous sample years, when 
only a footnote disclosure was required for pension deficits. Table 4 reports the coefficient 
estimates of the total asset value and equity value equations (equations (1) and (2) respectively) 
using the data derived from the financial statement for 2006 financial year. 
 
Table 4 
Coefficient Estimates for the Feldstein and Seligman Model Using 2006 Data 
Regression results for equation (1) and (2) using hand-collected data from corporate financial statement and 
Thomson ONE Banker. Panel A reports the coefficient estimates for the total market value equation (equation (1)) 
and the dependent variable is the firm’s total market value (debt and equity) scaled by the capital stock (firm’s 
physical assets, including tangible assets and inventories) of the firm. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates for 
the equity value equation (equation (2)) and the dependent variable is firm’s total market capitalization scaled by 
the net capital stock (capital stock (A) net of debt and preferred stock) of the firm. The sample period is 2006 
fiscal year. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A: Total Market Value Equation 
Constant E/A GROW DEBT/A PD/A BETA R2 
0.384 2.688 -0.313 0.074 0.314 0.252 0.386 
(0.274) (0.286) (0.215) (0.074) (0.371) (0.236)  
Panel B: Equity Value Equation 
Constant EE/AE GROWE DEBT/A PD/AE BETA R2 
1.182 15.651 -0.854 -0.327 1.334 -0.457 0.782 
(0.953) (1.040) (1.632) (0.293) (0.930) (0.817)  
 
                                                
12
 Cardinale (2005) decomposed pension deficits (for the US market) into balance sheet and off-balance sheet deficits 
and found a larger coefficient estimate on balance sheet deficits than off-balance sheet deficits. 
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Panel A and B show the coefficient estimates of the basic specifications for the total asset and 
equity value equations. Whilst the other parameters have expected signs, the coefficient estimates of 
pension deficit have lost explanatory power in both cases. The point estimate for pension deficit in 
the total market value equation is 0.31 and is marginally insignificant. Moreover, the null 
hypothesis that the point estimate for pension deficit and net debt are the same cannot be rejected 
either (results not reported), implying that now investors treat unfunded pension liabilities entering 
the balance sheet no different from the rest of corporate debts. The estimate for the pension deficit 
in the equity value equation is 1.33. Although insignificant again, the t-statistic is obvious higher 
than that in the total market value equation and the point estimate is significantly different from that 
of net debt (results not reported). Whilst the coefficient on debt has a negative sign, a higher 
pension deficit will increase the market value of the firm, however both estimates are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
We may summarise the market value results. First, shareholders do recognize the substitution effect 
between pension deficit and future pension benefit payments and incorporate this information into 
share prices. Second, our findings confirm the existence of the accounting veil where investors 
attach different weightings to balance sheet and off-balance sheet liabilities as confirmed by the 
different stock market sensitivities to pension deficits under the FRS17 transitional and full 
implementation arrangements. 
 
6. Estimation for the Asset Pricing Models 
6.1. Portfolio Formation Procedure and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of all FTSE350 firms (financial and non-financial) that have at least one 
defined benefit pension scheme and the sample period is from 2001 to 2005 financial years. On 
average there are 250 firms that satisfy the selection criteria each year
13
. 
 
The portfolio formation is based on the methodology suggested by Fama and French (1993). In July 
of year t the eligible firms are sorted into seven groups according to their FR at the end of fiscal 
year t – 1. The first group (OF) includes all the overfunded firms (FR ≤ 0) and the remaining six 
groups consist of all the underfunded firms (firms with positive FR). The 6 underfunded groups are 
                                                
13
 Besides the criteria discussed in Section 3.3, an eligible company for year t should also have a non-missing value of 
FR in fiscal year t-1. 
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constructed as following: group 1 to group 4 are the first four quintiles of the distribution of FR and 
group 5 and 6 are the 9th and the 10th deciles of the underfunded firms so these are the most 
underfunded firms. The reason for constructing the portfolios in this way is that the sample size is 
smaller than Franzoni and Marin (2006) and moreover, theory suggests that pension deficits should 
have little or no effect for less underfunded firms. Thus only the most underfunded firms are 
partitioned into deciles, where the effect of pension deficit is most prominent. Upon forming the FR 
portfolios, monthly value weighted and equally weighted portfolio returns are calculated for each 
group from the July of year t to the June of year t + 1. This process is iterated annually so in total 
there are 60 sample months for fiscal years 2001 to 2005.  
 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for the 7 FR portfolios. Panel A presents the funding status 
and the market capitalization of the portfolios. The overfunded firms have on average 7.5% surplus 
and for underfunded firms the funding ratio ranges from 0.7% to 39.4% percent. The size data 
indicates that small firms cluster in groups 5 and 6 - the most underfunded groups - and they also 
have the highest book-to-market ratio, implying that they are value–firms and are most likely to be 
undervalued. The average number of overfunded firms is 32, however this is mainly due to the large 
number of firms with positive FR in 2001, which is up to 72 firms. On average there are 39 
underfunded firms in each quintile of the distribution for negative FR. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the means and standard deviations for the returns of the value-weighted 
and equally-weighted portfolios over the 60 sample months from July 2002 to June 2006. The 
average returns of the most underfunded firms for both portfolios are not obviously any lower than 
the other groups of firms as indicated by the asset pricing model and neither is there a clear pattern 
in the distribution of the returns. Moreover there is no sign of a market value effect from the mean 
returns (as discussed in fn. 16). Portfolio 1, which has the least negative FR and therefore likely to 
have low book-to-market and low return, tends to have the highest earnings for both value-weighted 
(2.04%) and equally-weighted cases (1.74%). Although the most underfunded firms do not have the 
lowest raw returns their returns are also not comparatively higher than other FR portfolios, with the 
only exception being the value-weighted return for portfolio 6, which stands at a rather high level of 
1.42%. The last panel of Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations for the Fama-French 
factors. 
2
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To test whether the most underfunded companies earn lower returns and whether the low returns 
persist over the subsequent years, VW and EW compound average returns are calculated for all 7 
FR portfolios for the first 6 months (Y0.5) and the next three years (Y1, Y2, Y3 respectively) after 
portfolio formation and the results are presented in Table 6. Note that for the five sample years, 
compound returns are computed even though the full range of time-series data are not available for 
portfolios other than 2001 and 2002 with the intention that this will largely eliminate extreme 
numbers. Therefore returns in Y0.5 and Y1 are mean returns for the whole sample period but Y2 
are mean returns for 2002, 2003 and 2004 and Y3 consists of only 2002 and 2003 returns.  
 
In the first six months after portfolio formation, portfolio 1—the least underfunded firms—earns 
universally higher returns than the rest of the portfolios. The VW return is 18.3% annually and 
that’s more than 10% higher than the second largest return, and for the EW case the return is 8.64%, 
still more than 2.5% higher than the rest of the portfolios. This finding is confirmed by the Fama-
French three-factor regression that portfolio 1 earns significantly positive abnormal returns 
compared to the other portfolios. The reason why the VW return of OF portfolio is quite low is 
because the number of overfunded firms is only a small proportion for the whole sample and some 
firms (e.g. BP) of large size have low returns for the sample period, which is evident because when 
equally weighting returns, the effect vanishes.  
 
The raw returns on the most underfunded firms confirm the findings from sample descriptive 
statistics. The only exception is the VW return for portfolio 5, the second most underfunded 
portfolio, whose return is 0.45% for the first 6 months. However after one year of portfolio 
formation (Y1) its return has increased to 11.40% and is no longer much smaller than those of the 
other portfolios. Most likely to be small and value firms, portfolio 6 exhibits comparatively higher 
returns than the rest of the underfunded portfolios except for portfolio 1. The high return persists for 
up to 2 years although the relative difference between the returns decreases yearly. When firm size 
is not considered, Panel B of Table 6 shows that the EW return for portfolio 6, 2 years after 
portfolio formation increases to 50% annually—nearly double that of the VW case—and this is 
likely to be caused by the high returns for small companies. The overall evidence shows that there is 
no significant evidence of mispricing for the most underfunded firms using the raw return data.  
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Table 6 
Raw Returns 
FR is calculated as the net pension deficit (PD – PA) per pound of year-end market capitalization. In July of year t, 
firms with positive FR in December of year t – 1 are assigned to 6 groups. Group 1 to 4 are the firms with the first 
4 quintiles of the distribution of FR and group 5 and 6 are sorted according to the 9th and 10th deciles of the FR 
distribution. The 7th group consists of firms with negative FR thus are firms being overfunded (OF). For each 
year the portfolio is constructed, monthly returns are compounded in the first six months (Y0.5) and the following 
three years (Yi) without reforming the portfolios. Panel A and Panel B reports the mean compounded returns for 
VW and EW portfolios. FR is formed from July 2001 to July 2005 and the returns range from July 2002 to June 
2006.  Source: Corporate financial statement and Datastream. 
VW Returns  
 OF 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Most 
under0funded  
Y0.5 1.10 18.13 2.59 6.59 2.73 0.45 6.83 
Y1 11.97 23.28 8.59 10.74 12.39 11.40 19.68 
Y2 19.92 21.86 20.41 17.08 22.34 29.59 30.92 
Y3 23.51 22.42 26.54 11.07 17.94 29.92 24.97 
EW Returns  
 OF 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Y0.5 6.11 8.64 2.62 3.37 5.01 5.49 5.25 
Y1 17.94 21.43 15.36 14.52 19.33 19.74 22.93 
Y2 28.16 29.33 29.02 20.82 23.81 27.57 50.10 
Y3 22.16 23.17 19.53 18.68 20.48 26.94 24.77 
 
6.2. Parameter Estimates for the Factor Model 
The time-series regression from equation (4) shows that the return pattern indicated in the portfolio 
mean returns are even more pronounced after adjusting for risk. The parameter estimations are 
reported in Table 7.  
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Panel A shows the intercepts for both VW and EW portfolios. Consistent with the findings from the 
raw returns of portfolio 1, which contains underfunded firms with the lowest FR, all portfolios have 
significantly positive intercepts. For instance, portfolio 1 has an alpha of 1.12% for VW returns, 
which is more than 14% annually. The number for the EW portfolio return is lower but still 
compounds to more than 10% per year. Although the most underfunded portfolios—on average 
likely to be small and value companies—do not show high abnormal returns, the alphas are not 
significantly different from zero. Setting the significance level aside, the fact that the most 
underfunded firms (portfolio 5 and 6) have relatively lower alphas, imply that firms with the most 
severe funding status are overvalued, but the negative impact of pension deficit is offset by some 
positive effects
14
. These effects could be the market value effect discussed in Section 3.3, or the 
highly positive abnormal returns after 2003 following the stock market downturn in the previous 
few years. Notice that the alpha is not significantly different from zero either for overfunded firms, 
which is consistent with the findings of Franzoni and Marin (2006). The asymmetry effect of 
overfunded and underfunded plans can be explained by managerial short-termism (Stein (1989)), 
where firms can immediately use the overfunding to increase current earnings and cash flows so 
there is no delay between the materialisation of the overfunding and its positive impact on stock 
returns
15
. In unreported tests where overfunded firms are not separated from the sample, the 
regression shows a similar return pattern, showing that there is no misvaluation for overfunded 
firms.  
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the factor loadings for the portfolios. Consistent with the argument that 
the most underfunded firms are small firms, portfolios 5 and 6 have the highest loadings on SMB 
and HML. Given the high standard deviation of returns for this portfolio, it also tends to have high 
market beta. Given the regression results, there appears to be no sign of any systematic mis-
valuation for highly underfunded firms using the FR measurement of funding status from equation 
(3). Robustness tests were run using different denominators (such as total assets) and for firms of 
different book-to-market ratios, but these changes did not alter the results. In order to check whether 
there may be time effects in the regressions, the three-factor model was run in a panel data 
regression with fixed year effect (results not reported), again however this does not alter the results 
from cross-sectional regressions significantly. 
                                                
14
 The reason why in some cases the most underfunded portfolio (portfolio 6 in VW case) has higher abnormal returns 
than the second-most underfunded firms is believed to be caused by the outliers within portfolio 6. 
15
 Recall that the earnings surprise arises from such delay between the between the materialisation of the underfunding 
(through pension contributions) and its negative impact on stock returns. 
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Besides the short sample period and the size effect that might have caused these results? There are 
two more possible explanations. First, the results could imply that the wrong asset pricing model 
has been chosen. Kothari and Warner (1997) show that tests for long-run abnormal returns 
associated with specific events are severely mis-specified if the wrong model is chosen, which 
rapidly compounds to give large errors. Although the calendar-time portfolio suggested by Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) (and the model used by Franzoni and Marin (2006) and in this paper) 
provides an effective improvement for the compounding problem, it only performs well in random 
samples and the misspecification is still pervasive in non-random samples, which is the basis of the 
portfolio formation in this paper. A ‘bootstrapping’ approach may provide a solution to the problem. 
However even with more years of data, given the number of firms in each FR portfolio, this 
approach is not feasible with the current list of firms. Second, the results may be due to the UK’s 
pension funding regulations. According to the minimum funding requirement (MFR) (Pensions Act 
1995), schemes with large deficits do not need to make up the shortfall instantly but only need to do 
so over several years (usually three years for most underfunded schemes and up to ten years for less 
underfunded schemes). This is different from the US system, where firms must make annual 
contributions equal to the deficit of the plan plus any benefit cost accrued during the year. Therefore 
in the UK, pension contributions made to cover the deficit are smoothed over a number of years, 
and the financial pressure they impose on earnings may not be as prominent as for US firms. Of 
course this situation changed with the introduction of the Pensions Act 2004. In unreported results, 
although we have included one extra year of data for the year 2005, under the new funding 
regulations into our analysis, this does not have any significant impact on the overall results. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have argued that there are two related implications of the stock market efficiently incorporating 
information about pension fund deficits into share prices. First, if shareholders correctly realise that 
unfunded pension liabilities are a future obligation that must be paid out of the assets of the firm, 
then unfunded pension liabilities are like an equal amount of debt,  and will reduce the firm’s 
market value accordingly. Second, firms with large unfunded pension liabilities will be required to 
make futures contributions to the pension schemes, which will reduce the future profits of the firm. 
If share prices fully incorporate the effect of lower future earnings, then when lower future earnings 
are announced there should be no effect on share prices. Conversely if the market fails to 
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incorporate the effect of funding the deficit, there will be negative surprises in the market when 
earnings start to drop and negative abnormal returns will be observed. 
 
This paper empirically tests the above hypotheses for the UK market using two alternative 
methodologies, namely the market valuation model and the asset pricing model. Using a sample of 
UK FTSE350 firms with defined benefit pension schemes, we find that unfunded pension liabilities 
do reduce the market value of the firm but the coefficient estimates indicate a less than one-for-one 
effect. This is probably because as FRS17 transformed from transitional arrangement to full 
implementation, unfunded pension liabilities are required to enter the balance sheet and this will 
reduce the substitution effect of pension deficit on shareholders’ consumption. Another possible 
explanation arises from the uncertainty within unfunded pension liabilities. Investors may 
(systematically) believe that pension deficits will be smaller in the future because they believe the 
stock market will go up or interest rate and inflation will go down. Firms will then adjust their 
pension liabilities to reflect such expectations by changing assumptions underlying the valuation of 
pension deficits. This view may explain why the stock market sensitivity to pension deficits 
approaches the theoretically one-for-one effect when we account for the possible assumptions (e.g. 
discount rate and accounting methods) underlying the calculation of pension deficits in the market 
valuation model. Our findings are consistent with those observed by the Pensions Regulator, that 
‘deficits may be largely but by no means fully factored into share prices’. 
 
In addition, consistent with the findings from the market valuation model, there is no significant 
evidence of negative abnormal return for highly underfunded schemes and the results are not 
subject to the choice of funding status measure and portfolio formation procedures. However we do 
find that firms with better funded pension schemes earn higher returns regardless of the size of the 
firm and negative abnormal returns are found in firms with severely underfunded pension schemes 
even for firms with high book-to-market ratio, which means they should have a higher return. The 
overall findings indicate that firms with large pension deficit have lower earnings but the effect is 
possibly offset by the possible positive impact to earnings due to the overvaluation in portfolios 
with large funding ratio. The results could also be caused by the pension contribution regulations in 
the UK, where pension contributions made to cover the deficit are smoothed over a number of  
years and the financial pressure they impose on earnings is consequently weakened. 
 
31 
 
Our results are in line with the ‘classical’ market valuation model by Feldstein and Seligman (1981), 
implying that the change of the reporting regulations in a pension scheme deficit in an employer’s 
accounts is likely to impact on the market’s assessment of the employer’s value. However these 
effects may have been affected by the FRS17 transitional arrangements that unfunded pension 
contributions are not required to be disclosed in the balance sheet, and will not fully reduce the 
value of the firm even though pension deficits represent a true liability of the firm. This has been 
changed as the UK fully implements FRS17/IAS19 accounting standard where after-tax pension 
deficit must enter the balance sheet as retirement benefit liabilities. Moreover, the new Pensions Act 
(2004) has introduced a new firm-specific and non-smoothed funding rule for UK defined benefit 
pension schemes, which will certainly apply pressures on highly underfunded firms. All the 
aforementioned regulatory changes may alter the results in this paper and it remains an interesting 
question to see how market and shareholders react to pension deficits as a true balance sheet 
liability after the new regulations have been implemented. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
V Market value of the company, i.e. market capital, long term 
debt + common equity. 
A Firm’s capital stock, plant & equipment + total inventories 
E Total earning, Net Income Available to Common + interest 
expense on debt 
GROW Difference of 5-year average ACCOUNTING earning/A 
BETA As in Datastream 
DEBT Company’s net debt. 
PS Preferred stock 
AE A-DEBT-PS, asset value of equity 
EE Equity earning, total earning – interest payment on debt, Net 
Income Available to Common in Datastream. 
GROWE 10-year EE growth/AE 
PD Pension deficit from company annual report: pension 
liability – pension asset 
NET PD Pension deficit net of deferred tax and other non-recoverable 
surplus. 
VE MV of common stock. Share outstanding x end of year share 
price. 
Control Variables 
 
PAB Pension asset invested in bonds 
PAE Pension asset invested in equities 
NO. PLAN Number of (principal) schemes in one company 
PERPD Pension deficit per thousand scheme members 
PUAA =1 if the firm uses the combination of projected unit and 
attained age method to calculate the PV of pension assets. 
PU =1 if the firm uses the combination of projected unit method 
to calculate the PV of pension assets. 
DC =1 if the firm has at least one defined contribution pension 
scheme besides DB plans. 
HYB =1 if the firm has at least one hybrid pension scheme besides 
DB plans. 
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